Introduction
The United Kingdom’s uncodified constitution is often characterised by its evolutionary nature, adapting through convention, judicial interpretation, and piecemeal statutory reform rather than grand, systematic redesign. A recent feature of this evolution has been a series of 'constitutional clean-up' statutes, aimed at modernising discrete parts of the state apparatus. Within this context, the House of Lords remains a subject of perennial debate. While wholesale reform has stalled, incremental changes have been made to address some of its more anomalous features. The prompt for this essay, a hypothetical 'Removal of Peerages Bill' in a future government’s programme, raises a crucial question at the heart of this reformist agenda: should Parliament create a formal route to remove the honour of a peerage from a legislator, and what are the constitutional implications of such a move?
This essay will argue that while the objective of holding members of the legislature to account is a legitimate one, a statutory power to remove peerages represents an overreach that misunderstands the distinction between a peerage as an honour and membership of the House of Lords as a legislative function. It will contend that the existing mechanisms for suspension and expulsion, introduced by the House of Lords Reform Act 2014 and the House of Lords (Expulsion and Suspension) Act 2015, already provide an adequate and more constitutionally appropriate solution to the problem of misbehaving peers. Therefore, while the impulse for 'clean-up' is understandable, extending it to the revocation of honours crosses a significant constitutional boundary and is ultimately unnecessary. The proper limit of such legislation, this essay suggests, lies in regulating membership and conduct within the legislature, not in the revocation of honours conferred by the Crown.
The Current Framework for Peerage and Parliamentary Membership
To evaluate the case for a Removal of Peerages Bill, it is first necessary to understand the current legal framework. A peerage is fundamentally an honour, a title granted by the Sovereign on the advice of the Prime Minister, operating under the Royal Prerogative. For life peers, created under the Life Peerages Act 1958, this honour has historically carried with it the automatic right to sit and vote in the House of Lords for life. Until recently, the principle "once a peer, always a peer" was matched by "once a member of the House, always a member". There was no formal mechanism for removing a peer, short of specific and antiquated legislation for treason, as seen in the Forfeiture Act 1870, which resulted in disqualification from sitting but did not strip the title itself.
This situation was widely seen as untenable in a modern democracy. The lack of any accountability mechanism meant that peers convicted of serious crimes could, in theory, return to the legislature after serving their sentence. This was highlighted by cases such as that of Lord Archer of Weston-super-Mare, who was able to resume his seat after being imprisoned for perjury (House of Lords Library, 2015). Such instances damaged public perception of the House of Lords and fuelled calls for reform.
The response came not as a single, radical overhaul, but as two pieces of incremental 'clean-up' legislation. First, the House of Lords Reform Act 2014, a Private Member's Bill introduced by Danby Carter, created provisions for peers to retire permanently. It also provided that a peer who failed to attend the House for an entire session would cease to be a member. Second, and more significantly for this discussion, the House of Lords (Expulsion and Suspension) Act 2015 gave the House the power to suspend a member for a specified period or to expel them permanently. This power can be exercised if the House's Conduct Committee recommends it and the House agrees by resolution.
Crucially, neither of these Acts provides for the removal of the peerage itself. An expelled or retired peer ceases to be a legislator and loses their right to the associated allowances, but they retain their title. For example, Lord Ahmed, who retired from the House in 2020 following a recommendation that he be expelled for sexual misconduct, is no longer a member of the House of Lords but is still formally titled Lord Ahmed (House of Lords Conduct Committee, 2020). This distinction is central to the debate over whether further legislation is required.
The Case for a Removal of Peerages Bill
The primary argument for creating a formal mechanism to remove peerages is rooted in public confidence and the principle of accountability. Proponents of such a reform argue that allowing an individual who has been expelled from the legislature for gross misconduct to retain a title of honour brings both the honours system and Parliament into disrepute. As Lord Steel of Aikwood argued during debates on Lords reform, the public finds it "impossible to understand" how someone can be deemed unfit to legislate but fit to retain a title that suggests a position of honour and public service (HL Deb, 2015).
From this perspective, the 2014 and 2015 Acts did not go far enough. They solved the practical problem of preventing an unfit individual from influencing legislation, but they failed to address the symbolic and reputational damage. In an era where trust in politicians is low, the perceived impunity of disgraced peers retaining their titles can be seen as an offensive anachronism. A Removal of Peerages Bill would, therefore, be presented as a final and necessary step in the modernisation of the second chamber, aligning the status of peers with modern expectations of public life.
Furthermore, an argument can be made from the perspective of consistency. The Recall of MPs Act 2015 established a mechanism, albeit a limited one, for constituents to remove their Member of Parliament for misconduct. While the mechanism is different due to the elected nature of the Commons, it reflects a broader constitutional direction towards greater accountability for legislators. It appears inconsistent to have a recall system for MPs and expulsion for peers, but to leave the peer's honour intact while an MP simply returns to being a private citizen. Creating a power to strip the peerage could be seen as creating a degree of equivalence between the two Houses, recognising that membership in both is a privilege contingent on maintaining certain standards of conduct. A Bill to remove peerages could be framed as the logical conclusion of the 'clean-up' process that began with the 2014 and 2015 Acts.
Constitutional Complexities and the Limits of 'Clean-Up'
Despite the populist appeal of stripping titles from disgraced figures, a statutory power to remove peerages introduces considerable constitutional difficulties. The most significant issue is the confusion it creates between the legislative function of a peer and the peerage as an honour. The 2014 and 2015 Acts were constitutionally "clean" because they concerned themselves only with membership of, and conduct within, the House of Parliament. This falls squarely within Parliament's established authority to regulate its own composition and proceedings (the principle of exclusive cognisance). A peer's right to sit in the legislature is a matter of public and parliamentary law.
Conversely, the peerage itself is a dignity, an honour conferred by the Sovereign under the Royal Prerogative. While this prerogative is exercised on ministerial advice, it remains formally distinct from the legislative and political process. For Parliament to legislate to give itself, or a body acting on its behalf, the power to remove an honour would be a significant encroachment upon this aspect of the Royal Prerogative. As Bradley, Ewing and Knight (2018, p. 248) note, while statute can override the prerogative, to do so in the context of the honours system would be a novel and constitutionally significant step. It risks politicising the granting and, more pointedly, the removal of honours.
This leads to a second major objection: the risk of political abuse. A mechanism for removing peerages would be a powerful tool. Who would wield it? If the power rested with a government-controlled majority in the House of Commons, it could theoretically be used to target opposition or dissenting peers. Even if the power were vested in a committee, such as the House of Lords Conduct Committee, the process would be fraught with political pressure. The criteria for removal would have to be extraordinarily precise to avoid becoming a weapon for settling political scores. While proponents might suggest limiting it to cases of serious criminal conviction, even this is not straightforward. What constitutes a "serious" offence? And would it apply retrospectively? The existing Forfeiture Committee already deals with the removal of honours, but it is a secretive body operating under the prerogative, and a statutory replacement would invite much greater political controversy (Cabinet Office, 2019). The current system of expulsion from the House, based on breaches of the parliamentary Code of Conduct, is arguably a more contained and less politically volatile process.
Finally, one must ask whether such a reform is necessary to achieve its stated aims. The central purpose of accountability for legislators is to prevent those who are unfit for office from exercising public power. The House of Lords (Expulsion and Suspension) Act 2015 achieves this fully and effectively. An expelled peer cannot vote, speak, or claim allowances. They are, for all practical purposes, removed from public life. The problem of their retaining the title is one of public relations and symbolism, not of constitutional function. It is arguable that using primary legislation to solve a symbolic issue, especially when it involves encroaching on constitutional principle, is a disproportionate response. The 'clean-up' legislation has already cleaned the legislature; attempting to 'clean' the list of honorifics is a different and more problematic task. This represents a logical limit to such legislation: it should concern itself with the machinery of government, not the symbolic architecture of the state.
Conclusion
The proposition of a 'Removal of Peerages Bill' is an understandable response to public concern over standards in public life. The image of an individual expelled from the legislature for misconduct yet retaining an honorific title is jarring to modern sensibilities. However, this essay has argued that such a reform, while superficially attractive, is both constitutionally problematic and practically unnecessary.
The existing framework, established by the House of Lords Reform Act 2014 and the House of Lords (Expulsion and Suspension) Act 2015, provides a robust and constitutionally sound method for removing unfit individuals from the legislature. These Acts correctly identify the problem as one of legislative function, not of personal honour, and their provisions are rightly confined to regulating membership of the House. By expelling a member, Parliament removes their ability to participate in the legislative process, which is the most important sanction it can apply.
To go further and create a statutory power to remove the peerage itself would be to conflate the role of legislator with the status of an honour granted by the Crown. This would represent a significant statutory encroachment on the Royal Prerogative and risk politicising the entire honours system. The practical difficulties of designing a fair and impartial process for removal, insulated from political abuse, would be immense. Given that the substantive problem of removing misbehaving peers from the legislative process has already been solved, the case for this further, more constitutionally disruptive step is weak. The concept of 'constitutional clean-up' has its limits, and that limit should lie at the point where the practical business of governing ends and the symbolic role of the Crown begins. Parliament should ensure its own House is in order, a task it can now accomplish, but the stripping of titles is a step too far.
References
Bradley, A., Ewing, K. and Knight, C. (2018) Constitutional and Administrative Law. 17th edn. Pearson.
Cabinet Office (2019) Honours forfeiture: guidance. [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/honours-forfeiture-guidance (Accessed: 20 May 2024).
HL Deb 26 January 2015, vol 759, col 11.
House of Lords Conduct Committee (2020) The conduct of Lord Ahmed. 7th Report of Session 2019–21, HL Paper 198. [Online] Available at: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/3720/documents/35999/default/ (Accessed: 20 May 2024).
House of Lords Library (2015) House of Lords (Expulsion and Suspension) Bill [HL]. HL Bill 6 of 2015–16.
House of Lords (Expulsion and Suspension) Act 2015. c. 11.
House of Lords Reform Act 2014. c. 24.
Life Peerages Act 1958. c. 21.
Forfeiture Act 1870. c. 23.
Recall of MPs Act 2015. c. 25.
