Introduction
The trust recognised in Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567 occupies a peculiar position in English trust law. Where money is lent for a specific purpose that subsequently fails, the lender acquires an equitable proprietary interest enforceable against the borrower’s creditors. The practical utility of this outcome is considerable, particularly in insolvency. Yet the doctrinal foundation upon which it rests has generated sustained scholarly disagreement over five decades. The central difficulty is classificatory: the Quistclose trust does not sit comfortably within orthodox categories of express, resulting or constructive trust, and the nature of the beneficial interest during the period before the purpose fails remains deeply contested. When the House of Lords revisited the question in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12; [2002] 2 AC 164, Lord Millett offered a unifying analysis grounded in the resulting trust, purporting to resolve the doctrinal confusion. This essay argues that Twinsectra did not succeed in rationalising the Quistclose trust. Lord Millett’s analysis, while intellectually elegant, introduced its own difficulties—particularly regarding the concept of a resulting trust arising at the moment of payment despite the lender’s evident intention to transfer beneficial ownership for a specific purpose—and failed to command universal judicial or academic assent. The Quistclose trust remains anomalous not because the result it reaches is unjust, but because no single doctrinal explanation adequately accounts for all the features of the arrangement. The real source of the anomaly lies in the tension between the law’s insistence on fitting purpose-based arrangements into the bilateral trust framework and the functional reality that the Quistclose mechanism serves a sui generis role in protecting lenders against insolvency risk.
The Original Decision and Its Doctrinal Ambiguity
In Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567, Rolls Razor Ltd, a company in severe financial difficulty, borrowed money from Quistclose Investments for the specific purpose of paying a dividend already declared to its shareholders. The loan money was placed in a separate account at Barclays Bank. Before the dividend was paid, Rolls Razor went into voluntary liquidation. The question was whether the money in the account belonged to Quistclose (subject to an equitable interest) or formed part of the general assets available to Rolls Razor’s creditors. Lord Wilberforce, delivering the principal speech, held that the money was held on trust for the stipulated purpose—payment of the dividend—and that upon failure of that purpose, a secondary trust arose in favour of Quistclose. The bank’s claim to set off the money against Rolls Razor’s overdraft therefore failed.
The difficulty with Lord Wilberforce’s analysis lies in its studied ambiguity regarding the nature of the trust. His Lordship described the arrangement as involving a “primary” trust to apply the money for the stated purpose and a “secondary” trust in favour of the lender if the purpose failed (at 580). He drew an analogy with trusts for charitable purposes where the purpose cannot be fulfilled. However, he did not clearly categorise the trust as express, resulting or constructive, nor did he explain with precision who held the beneficial interest during the life of the primary trust. As Chambers observed, Lord Wilberforce’s reasoning left open a fundamental question: if there was a primary trust to apply funds for a purpose, who was the beneficiary of that trust? (Chambers, 1997, pp. 68–71). Under the orthodox principle in Morice v Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves 399 and its progeny, a private trust must have ascertainable beneficiaries; a trust for a mere purpose is void unless it falls within recognised anomalous exceptions or is charitable. The Quistclose primary trust, if it was truly a purpose trust, appeared to violate this fundamental requirement.
Lord Wilberforce’s speech can be read as implicitly treating the dividend recipients as beneficiaries of the primary trust, which would make the arrangement an express trust for persons. However, this interpretation sits uneasily with the facts, because the dividend recipients had no right to enforce the trust and were not parties to the loan agreement. Alternatively, the primary trust could be understood as a form of mandate or power to apply funds, with beneficial interest remaining throughout with the lender. This latter reading subsequently became the foundation of Lord Millett’s analysis in Twinsectra, but it was not explicit in Barclays Bank v Quistclose itself. The ambiguity of the original decision is therefore the root cause of the doctrinal difficulty that followed.
Competing Academic Classifications Before Twinsectra
The decades between Quistclose and Twinsectra saw a proliferation of academic theories attempting to explain the doctrinal basis of the trust. These competing analyses reveal the depth of the classificatory problem and provide the context against which Lord Millett’s attempted rationalisation must be assessed.
The Express Trust Analysis
One approach, advanced by Rickett (1991), treated the Quistclose arrangement as an express trust created by the agreement of lender and borrower. On this view, the parties’ intention that the money be applied for a specific purpose, combined with the loan terms restricting its use, constitutes a declaration of trust. The difficulty, as Rickett acknowledged, is identifying the beneficiary during the currency of the primary trust. If the intended payees (in Quistclose, the shareholders awaiting dividends) are the beneficiaries, it is unclear why they have no standing to enforce the trust. If the lender is the beneficiary throughout, the arrangement looks like a resulting trust from the outset, and the “primary” trust language becomes misleading (Rickett, 1991). Moreover, characterising the arrangement as an express trust raises questions about compliance with formality requirements and the certainties, since the lender and borrower rarely articulate their intentions in terms of trust creation.
The Constructive Trust Analysis
An alternative approach treats the Quistclose trust as a constructive trust imposed by law to prevent the borrower—or, more pertinently, the borrower’s creditors—from unconscionably benefiting from funds that were advanced for a restricted purpose. This view finds some support in the broader principle that equity intervenes to prevent unjust enrichment where money has been transferred under a qualifying condition. However, as Swadling (2004) argued, the constructive trust analysis is difficult to reconcile with orthodox principles because the trust appears to arise from the parties’ intentions rather than from equitable intervention independent of those intentions. The constructive trust label also risks obscuring the analytical question of where beneficial interest lies, since constructive trusts in English law arise in heterogeneous circumstances and the label does little explanatory work on its own.
The Resulting Trust Analysis
The most influential pre-Twinsectra analysis was advanced by Chambers (1997), who argued that the Quistclose trust is best understood as a resulting trust. On this view, the lender never parts with the beneficial interest in the money. The borrower receives legal title subject to a duty to apply the funds for the stipulated purpose, but the lender retains equitable ownership throughout. If the purpose fails, the beneficial interest “results” back to the lender—or, more precisely, it was never transferred away. Chambers argued that this analysis avoids the purpose trust problem entirely: there is no need to identify beneficiaries of a primary purpose trust because there is no such trust. The borrower holds on resulting trust for the lender from the moment of payment, subject to a power (not a trust obligation) to apply the funds for the agreed purpose (Chambers, 1997, pp. 68–85).
This was the analysis that Lord Millett adopted, first extra-judicially (Millett, 1985) and then judicially in Twinsectra. Its elegance lies in its simplicity: a single resulting trust throughout, rather than the awkward two-trust structure proposed by Lord Wilberforce. Yet, as will be discussed below, the analysis raises significant difficulties of its own.
Lord Millett’s Rationalisation in Twinsectra v Yardley
In Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12; [2002] 2 AC 164, Twinsectra lent £1 million to Mr Yardley through his solicitor, Mr Sims, on terms that the money would be used solely for the acquisition of property. Mr Sims gave an undertaking to that effect. The money was paid to another solicitor, Mr Leach, who released it to Mr Yardley, who used a substantial part for purposes other than property acquisition. Twinsectra sought to recover the money, partly on the basis that the funds had been held on a Quistclose trust and that Mr Leach had incurred accessory liability for dishonest assistance in a breach of that trust.
The House of Lords held that the loan terms gave rise to a trust and that Mr Leach was liable for dishonest assistance (although the majority’s analysis of dishonesty, applying the combined objective-subjective test, attracted its own controversy, subsequently addressed in Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust International Ltd [2005] UKPC 37). For present purposes, the significant contribution was Lord Millett’s analysis of the Quistclose trust mechanism.
Lord Millett identified four possible analyses of the Quistclose arrangement (at [81]–[100]): (i) an express trust for the lender with a mandate to the borrower to apply the money for the specified purpose; (ii) an express trust in favour of the ultimate recipients of the money (the purpose payees); (iii) a purpose trust with a resulting trust arising on failure of the purpose; and (iv) a resulting trust for the lender from the outset, with a power in the borrower to apply the money for the stated purpose. His Lordship rejected the second and third analyses—the second because the purpose payees had no enforceable rights, and the third because it contravened the beneficiary principle—and favoured the fourth. The borrower at no point holds the beneficial interest. From the moment of payment, the lender retains equitable ownership under a resulting trust, and the borrower has only a power to apply the funds for the designated purpose. If that power is exercised, the lender’s equitable interest is overreached. If the purpose fails or the power is not exercised, the lender’s beneficial interest becomes enforceable in the ordinary way.
Lord Millett’s analysis aligns with Chambers’ academic work and has the attraction of internal consistency. It avoids the purpose trust objection, explains the lender’s priority in insolvency, and dispenses with the awkward “primary” and “secondary” trust language. However, it did not command explicit agreement from the other members of the House. Lord Hoffmann agreed with Lord Millett’s speech but did not specifically endorse the resulting trust analysis. The other Law Lords did not address the theoretical question in any detail. Accordingly, while Lord Millett’s analysis has been treated by some subsequent courts as authoritative, it lacks the status of a binding ratio on the doctrinal classification of the Quistclose trust.
The Difficulties with Lord Millett’s Resulting Trust Analysis
Lord Millett’s analysis, for all its elegance, gives rise to several significant objections that collectively demonstrate why Twinsectra did not fully rationalise the Quistclose trust.
The Intention Problem
The resulting trust traditionally arises where a transferor does not intend to benefit the transferee. This is the orthodox understanding affirmed in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, who stated (at 708) that a resulting trust arises where property is transferred and the transferor did not intend to benefit the transferee. Chambers developed this into a general theory of resulting trusts as responding to the absence of an intention to benefit (Chambers, 1997, pp. 1–35). On Lord Millett’s Quistclose analysis, the lender never intends to transfer beneficial ownership to the borrower, and so a resulting trust arises immediately.
The difficulty is that the lender plainly does intend the borrower to have the use and application of the money—that is the very point of making the loan. The restriction is on the purpose of use, not on use itself. As Swadling (2004) argued, characterising the lender’s intention as an absence of intention to benefit is strained. A lender who advances money on terms that it must be used to acquire property is not withholding beneficial interest in the same way as a person who places money into a joint account for administrative convenience, as in Vandervell v IRC [1967] 2 AC 291. The Quistclose lender intends the borrower to have the money, but for a restricted purpose. To say that this equates to an absence of intention to benefit, sufficient to trigger a resulting trust at the moment of transfer, arguably stretches the resulting trust concept beyond its natural meaning. Virgo (2012, p. 308) similarly observed that the resulting trust analysis in this context conflates two different things: an intention to benefit conditionally and a total absence of intention to benefit.
The Power Analysis and Its Limitations
Lord Millett characterised the borrower’s entitlement as a “power” to apply the funds for the stated purpose, not a trust obligation. This distinction carries significant consequences. A power is discretionary; a trust obligation is mandatory. If the borrower holds merely a power, then no one—not even the intended purpose payees—can compel the borrower to apply the money. The lender’s beneficial interest subsists throughout, and the only question is whether the power is exercised.
This creates a conceptual tension. In practice, Quistclose arrangements arise in the context of commercial lending, where the borrower is obliged by the loan agreement to apply the funds for the specified purpose. The lender does not regard the borrower as having a discretion; the lender expects performance of a contractual obligation. To describe this as a mere power sits oddly with the commercial reality and with the contractual terms. As Hudson (2021, p. 599) noted, the power analysis may accurately describe the equitable position but does so at the cost of divorcing the trust analysis from the commercial context in which it operates. The disconnect between the contractual obligation to apply funds and the equitable characterisation as a discretionary power is a source of analytical discomfort that Lord Millett’s framework does not fully resolve.
The Overreaching Mechanism
Lord Millett explained that when the borrower properly exercises the power and applies the funds for the stipulated purpose, the lender’s equitable interest is “overreached.” The money reaches the intended payee free of the trust. However, the mechanism by which overreaching operates in this context is underexplained. In the context of land, overreaching is a statutory mechanism governed by the Law of Property Act 1925. In the context of chattels or choses in action, the concept is less well defined. The analogy with overreaching is suggestive rather than rigorous, and subsequent case law has not developed a clear account of how the lender’s equitable interest is discharged upon proper application of funds. This is a lacuna rather than a fatal defect, but it is indicative of the broader point that Lord Millett’s framework, while coherent at a high level of abstraction, leaves important operational questions unanswered.
The Relationship with the Beneficiary Principle
A key advantage claimed for Lord Millett’s analysis is that it avoids the purpose trust objection. Since there is no primary purpose trust—only a resulting trust for the lender plus a power in the borrower—there is no need to identify beneficiaries of a purpose trust. However, Penner (2014, pp. 280–284) questioned whether this avoidance is entirely successful. If the borrower holds a power to apply funds for a purpose, the arrangement still has a purpose-based character. The power must be defined by reference to the purpose; the purpose determines whether the power has been properly exercised. The beneficiary principle is avoided formally, but the substance of the arrangement remains purpose-driven. Penner suggested that a more honest analysis would acknowledge the Quistclose trust as a genuine, if limited, exception to the beneficiary principle, rather than engineering an elaborate doctrinal detour to avoid confronting the exception directly.
Post-Twinsectra Judicial Application: Clarification or Continued Uncertainty?
If Twinsectra had successfully rationalised the Quistclose trust, one would expect subsequent case law to apply Lord Millett’s framework consistently. The post-Twinsectra authorities reveal a more complex picture.
In Bieber v Teathers Ltd (In Liquidation) [2012] EWCA Civ 1466; [2013] 1 BCLC 248, the Court of Appeal applied the Quistclose trust to funds advanced for a specific investment purpose. The court treated the existence of a trust as depending on the parties’ objective intentions, drawing on Lord Millett’s analysis. However, the Court of Appeal did not engage in detailed discussion of whether the resulting trust analysis or some other classification was correct; it was sufficient that the money was advanced for a restricted purpose and that the purpose had failed. The doctrinal classification was not central to the decision. Similarly, in Challinor v Juliet Bellis & Co [2015] EWCA Civ 59, the Court of Appeal recognised a Quistclose-type trust without analysing the competing doctrinal frameworks in depth.
More illuminating is Charity Commission for England and Wales v Framjee [2014] EWHC 2507 (Ch), where the High Court considered donations made through an online platform for specific charitable purposes. The court applied Quistclose principles to find that the donors retained a beneficial interest where the purpose could not be fulfilled. The judgment drew on Lord Millett’s analysis but did not rely exclusively on it. This suggests that courts are willing to apply the practical outcome of the Quistclose mechanism without committing to a particular doctrinal explanation, which is precisely the pattern one would expect if the trust had not been fully rationalised.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Bellis v Challinor [2015] EWCA Civ 59 and the Privy Council’s approach in Federal Republic of Brazil v Durant International Corp [2015] UKPC 35 further suggest that the courts are pragmatic about Quistclose trusts: they enforce the commercial expectation that restricted-purpose money is protected, without insisting on a definitive theoretical classification. This judicial pragmatism is understandable but is itself evidence that the doctrinal anomaly persists. A fully rationalised doctrine would not need to be applied pragmatically in avoidance of its theoretical foundations.
The Deeper Anomaly: Purpose and the Trust Framework
The persistent difficulty in classifying the Quistclose trust reflects a deeper tension in English trust law between the beneficiary principle and the commercial need for purpose-based equitable protection. English law has historically been hostile to non-charitable purpose trusts, for well-known reasons articulated in Morice v Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves 399 and reaffirmed in Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts [1952] Ch 534: a trust requires an ascertainable beneficiary who can enforce it; without such a person, the court cannot supervise the trust’s administration. The recognised exceptions—trusts for the maintenance of specific animals, the erection of monuments, the saying of masses, and similar anomalous cases—are accepted grudgingly and are not extended (Re Endacott [1960] Ch 232).
The Quistclose trust is, in functional terms, a purpose trust: money is advanced for a purpose, and if the purpose fails, the money returns. The purpose defines the scope of the borrower’s authority and the event that triggers the lender’s right to recover. Regardless of the label attached—resulting trust, express trust, power—the substance of the arrangement is purpose-driven. The doctrinal difficulty arises because English law insists on fitting this purpose-driven arrangement into a framework designed for bilateral obligations between trustees and beneficiaries. Lord Millett’s resulting trust analysis is an ingenious attempt to do so, but the very ingenuity required is evidence that the underlying arrangement does not naturally fit.
Glister (2004) argued that the Quistclose trust should be openly acknowledged as a purpose trust, subject to its own rules, rather than forced into the resulting trust category. On this view, the anomaly is not that the Quistclose trust exists, but that the law refuses to call it what it is. The beneficiary principle, Glister suggested, should be understood as a rule of enforceability rather than validity: a purpose trust is valid provided there is someone—the lender—with standing to enforce it. This approach would bring doctrinal honesty but would require a modification of the beneficiary principle that neither the courts nor Parliament have been willing to make.
By contrast, Swadling (2004) maintained that the resulting trust classification is incorrect and that the arrangement is better understood as an express trust, with the lender as beneficiary throughout, subject to the borrower’s contractual and equitable obligation to apply funds for the purpose. On this view, there is nothing anomalous: the lender declares an express trust of the loan money, with the lender as beneficiary, and authorises the borrower to apply it in a specific way. The difficulty with this analysis, as Chambers (1997) and Lord Millett both noted, is that it is hard to see how a lender who advances money under a loan agreement is “declaring a trust” in any meaningful sense. The language of trust creation does not match the commercial reality.
The persistence of these competing views—resulting trust, express trust, constructive trust, purpose trust, sui generis arrangement—is the strongest evidence that the Quistclose trust is genuinely anomalous. A rationalised doctrine would not sustain this degree of scholarly disagreement over its basic classification.
Is the Anomaly Objectionable?
A separate question is whether the doctrinal anomaly matters. The Quistclose trust consistently produces outcomes that are commercially sensible: lenders who advance money for restricted purposes are protected against the borrower’s insolvency, which is the situation where the trust most commonly matters. The trust thus serves a clear function in commercial life, and its practical operation is reasonably well understood even if its theoretical foundation is contested.
However, doctrinal uncertainty has practical consequences. First, it creates difficulty in advising clients about the conditions under which a Quistclose trust will be found. The factors that distinguish a restricted-purpose loan (giving rise to a trust) from an unrestricted loan (creating only a debtor-creditor relationship) are not always clear. In Twinsectra itself, the existence of the trust was not seriously disputed, but in marginal cases—where the restriction on purpose is less explicit, or where the money is mixed with other funds—the outcome is harder to predict. Lord Millett stated (at [74]) that the question is one of construction: whether the parties intended the money to be at the borrower’s free disposal or subject to restrictions giving rise to a trust. This is a factual inquiry, and its outcome depends on the terms of the particular arrangement. But the conceptual framework within which that factual inquiry is conducted remains uncertain, and different frameworks may yield different results in borderline cases.
Secondly, the classification of the trust has implications for third-party liability. If the Quistclose trust is a resulting trust, the borrower never holds the beneficial interest, and anyone who knowingly assists the borrower in misapplying the funds may incur accessory liability for dishonest assistance in breach of trust. If it is an express trust, the same result follows but through different reasoning. If it is a constructive trust, the basis of the accessory’s liability may be different again. In Twinsectra, Mr Leach’s liability for dishonest assistance depended on the existence of a trust and a breach of that trust. The majority’s controversial reformulation of the dishonesty test attracted most attention, but the underlying question—what kind of trust was breached—was left imprecise by the divergent analyses of the Law Lords.
Thirdly, the Quistclose trust interacts with other areas of law, including the law of security interests and insolvency. If the Quistclose trust gives the lender a proprietary interest from the moment of payment, it operates functionally as an unregistered security interest, allowing the lender to leap over the borrower’s unsecured creditors in insolvency. Worthington (1996) argued that this raises policy concerns about the circumvention of registration requirements under what is now the Companies Act 2006, Part 25. If lenders can achieve priority through a trust mechanism that need not be registered, unsecured creditors are disadvantaged without notice. The doctrinal uncertainty about the trust’s basis makes it harder to determine whether and how insolvency law should respond to this concern. A clear classification might enable a clearer policy response.
Could a Future Decision Resolve the Anomaly?
It is worth considering whether a future Supreme Court decision could succeed where Twinsectra did not. The prospects are mixed. On one hand, the Supreme Court could endorse Lord Millett’s resulting trust analysis as the settled law, which would at least provide a single authoritative framework. On the other hand, as this essay has argued, the resulting trust analysis itself generates significant objections, and judicial endorsement would not eliminate those objections—it would merely suppress them.
An alternative route would be for the Supreme Court to acknowledge openly that the Quistclose trust is a limited exception to the beneficiary principle: a private purpose trust that is valid because the lender has standing to enforce it. This would be doctrinally honest and would end the classificatory debate. However, it would require the court to accept a modification to one of the foundational principles of trust law, with uncertain implications for the law of purpose trusts more broadly. The courts have historically been reluctant to create new categories of valid purpose trust, and it is doubtful whether a future court would take this step when the existing pragmatic approach produces satisfactory outcomes in most cases.
A third possibility is legislative intervention. The Law Commission has not, to date, recommended specific reform of the Quistclose trust, and the trust’s operation is too commercially embedded to be easily displaced. Legislative codification of the conditions under which a restricted-purpose loan gives rise to a trust would provide certainty but would require Parliament to make the doctrinal choice that the courts have avoided. Given the low likelihood of parliamentary time being devoted to this relatively specialised issue, legislative resolution is improbable in the near term.
The most realistic prognosis is that the Quistclose trust will continue to operate pragmatically, with courts applying the practical test—was the money advanced for a restricted purpose?—without resolving the theoretical classification. This is not a satisfactory state of affairs from a doctrinal perspective, but it may be an acceptable one from a practical standpoint, provided that the conditions for the trust’s creation are applied with reasonable consistency.
Conclusion
The Quistclose trust remains a doctrinal anomaly. Lord Wilberforce’s original analysis in Barclays Bank v Quistclose [1970] AC 567 left fundamental questions unanswered about the nature of the primary and secondary trusts, the location of the beneficial interest, and the relationship between the arrangement and the beneficiary principle. Lord Millett’s resulting trust analysis in Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 offered an intellectually coherent alternative, but it did not command unanimous support from the other Law Lords, it strained the concept of resulting trust beyond its natural limits, and it introduced difficulties of its own—particularly the characterisation of the borrower’s obligation as a mere power and the imprecise overreaching mechanism. Post-Twinsectra case law has applied Quistclose trusts pragmatically without resolving the doctrinal controversy, and academic opinion remains divided among at least four competing classifications.
The deeper cause of the anomaly is the English law’s insistence on fitting a purpose-driven arrangement into a framework designed for trusts with ascertainable beneficiaries. The Quistclose trust is, in substance, a limited private purpose trust, and no amount of doctrinal re-labelling can fully conceal this. The anomaly is not fatal to the trust’s practical operation, which continues to serve a valuable commercial function. But it is a genuine doctrinal weakness that Twinsectra mitigated without eliminating. The strongest view is that the Quistclose trust will be fully rationalised only when the law is prepared to acknowledge it as what it functionally is—a controlled exception to the beneficiary principle, justified by the lender’s standing to enforce it—rather than as an orthodox resulting trust operating through a notional absence of intention to benefit. Until that acknowledgment is made, the anomaly will persist.
References
- Chambers, R. (1997) Resulting Trusts. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Glister, J. (2004) ‘The Role of Trusts in the Quistclose Arrangement.’ Child and Family Law Quarterly, 16(2), pp. 1–20. [Note: I am unable to verify the exact journal and volume in which Glister’s argument on the Quistclose trust as a purpose trust appeared; the reference should be independently verified.]
- Hudson, A. (2021) Equity and Trusts. 10th edn. London: Routledge.
- Millett, P. (1985) ‘The Quistclose Trust: Who Can Enforce It?’ Law Quarterly Review, 101, pp. 269–284.
- Penner, J.E. (2014) The Law of Trusts. 9th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rickett, C. (1991) ‘Different Views on the Scope of the Quistclose Analysis: English and Antipodean Insights.’ Law Quarterly Review, 107, pp. 608–634.
- Swadling, W. (2004) ‘Orthodoxy’ in Swadling, W. (ed.) The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essays. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 1–28.
- Virgo, G. (2012) The Principles of Equity and Trusts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Worthington, S. (1996) ‘Proprietary Interests in Commercial Transactions.’ Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Table of Cases
- Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567 (HL)
- Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust International Ltd [2005] UKPC 37
- Bieber v Teathers Ltd (In Liquidation) [2012] EWCA Civ 1466; [2013] 1 BCLC 248
- Challinor v Juliet Bellis & Co [2015] EWCA Civ 59
- Charity Commission for England and Wales v Framjee [2014] EWHC 2507 (Ch)
- Federal Republic of Brazil v Durant International Corp [2015] UKPC 35
- Morice v Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves 399
- Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts [1952] Ch 534
- Re Endacott [1960] Ch 232
- Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12; [2002] 2 AC 164
- Vandervell v IRC [1967] 2 AC 291
- Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669
