Introduction
The West African region has recently experienced a significant pattern of democratic decline, marked by a resurgence of military coups after a period of democratisation in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The unconstitutional seizures of power in nations such as Mali (2020, 2021), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023) have raised serious questions about the stability of constitutional governance in the region. These events are not isolated incidents but are symptomatic of deeper, interconnected problems. This essay will provide an overview of the key factors that have contributed to this trend of military intervention and the resulting constitutional instability. The discussion will focus on the drivers behind these coups, including failures in governance and security, before examining the specific role of constitutional weaknesses. Finally, it will consider the legal and political responses of regional bodies, particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the limitations of these interventions.
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The Underlying Drivers of Military Intervention
A primary set of factors leading to military coups in West Africa relates to significant deficits in civilian governance. In many of the affected states, democratic governments have been perceived by their populations as corrupt, inept, and disconnected from the needs of ordinary citizens (Salau, 2023). Widespread corruption diverts state resources away from essential public services such as healthcare and education, breeding public resentment and eroding the legitimacy of the state. When democratic institutions fail to deliver tangible benefits or ensure accountable leadership, they become vulnerable. The military can then exploit this public disillusionment, often presenting itself as a corrective force capable of restoring order and integrity to the state, a narrative which can initially generate popular support for the coup (Onapajo, 2023).
Furthermore, a deteriorating security situation across the Sahel has been a major catalyst for military takeovers. The expansion of violent extremist organisations linked to groups like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State has created a profound and persistent state of insecurity that civilian governments have struggled to contain (International Crisis Group, 2023). National armed forces are on the front line of this conflict, and a perception often develops within the military that civilian political leaders are either unwilling or unable to provide the necessary resources and strategic direction to win the fight. For example, the coups in both Mali and Burkina Faso were explicitly justified by the ruling juntas as a necessary response to the failure of the previous governments to effectively combat the jihadist insurgency (Duhem, 2022). In this context, the military reframes its intervention not as a power grab, but as a patriotic duty to protect national sovereignty and security.
Constitutional Weaknesses and Political Tensions
Beyond general governance failures, specific weaknesses within the constitutional frameworks of these nations have also created fertile ground for instability. A core principle of constitutionalism is that the constitution is the supreme law and that all state power is limited by it. However, in practice, this principle is often weak. The rule of law is frequently undermined by powerful executives who operate with a degree of impunity, and institutions designed to provide checks and balances, such as the judiciary and the legislature, often lack the independence or capacity to hold the executive to account (Ajala, 2022). This creates an environment where constitutional norms can be easily set aside.
A particularly destabilising factor has been the trend of what is sometimes termed a ‘constitutional coup’, where incumbent leaders manipulate or amend national constitutions to circumvent presidential term limits and prolong their rule (Orock, 2021). This occurred in Guinea, where President Alpha Condé pushed through a constitutional referendum in 2020 allowing him to run for a controversial third term, and in Côte d'Ivoire. Such actions are deeply damaging to democratic legitimacy. They signal that the constitution is not a binding charter but a political tool for the powerful, which in turn erodes public trust in democratic processes. This can provide a justification for military actors to intervene, claiming they are acting to restore the original constitutional order that the civilian leader violated. This creates a paradox where the military positions itself as the defender of a constitution that it is simultaneously suspending through its own unconstitutional actions.
Regional Responses and Their Limitations
In response to this wave of coups, regional organisations, principally the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS, have invoked their normative frameworks designed to uphold democratic governance. The ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001) contains a ‘zero tolerance’ policy towards unconstitutional changes of government. The typical response following a coup involves the immediate suspension of the country from the organisation's decision-making bodies and the imposition of economic and financial sanctions, as was seen in the cases of Mali, Guinea, and Niger (ECOWAS, 2023). The aim is to isolate the new military regime and exert pressure for a swift return to constitutional order and civilian rule.
However, the effectiveness of this approach has been questionable. Firstly, there have been persistent accusations of double standards. Regional bodies have been criticised for acting decisively against military coups while remaining largely silent on the ‘constitutional coups’ perpetrated by incumbent presidents extending their terms (Aning and Poku, 2021). This inconsistency undermines the moral and legal authority of their interventions, leading some to view the sanctions as a defence of the ruling political class rather than of democratic principles. Secondly, the sanctions themselves have had a limited impact on the behaviour of the juntas, who have often proven resilient. Instead, broad economic sanctions can inflict significant hardship on the general population, potentially deepening the humanitarian crisis and even fostering anti-ECOWAS sentiment, which can be exploited by the military rulers to bolster their own nationalist credentials. The decision of the juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in early 2024 to withdraw from ECOWAS altogether highlights the severe limits of external pressure and the fracturing of regional solidarity (Al Jazeera, 2024).
Conclusion
In conclusion, the recent resurgence of military coups and the corresponding constitutional instability in West Africa stem from a complex interplay of factors. Endemic problems of poor governance, pervasive corruption, and acute security crises have eroded public faith in civilian democratic rule, creating an environment where military intervention can be seen by some as a viable alternative. This is compounded by inherent weaknesses in the constitutional order, where principles of the rule of law are fragile and constitutional rules, particularly term limits, are manipulated by political elites. While regional bodies like ECOWAS possess legal frameworks intended to prevent unconstitutional changes of government, their responses have proven to have significant limitations. Sanctions have not consistently compelled a return to civilian rule and have been weakened by accusations of inconsistency. Ultimately, tackling constitutional instability in the region requires more than just a reactive condemnation of coups; it demands a sustained commitment to addressing the root causes of democratic fragility, strengthening institutions of governance, and ensuring that constitutionalism delivers tangible benefits for the citizens of West Africa.
References
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Al Jazeera. (2024) <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/mali-burkina-faso-and-niger-quit-west-african-bloc-ecowas">Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger quit West African bloc ECOWAS</a>. Al Jazeera News.
Aning, K. and Poku, N. (2021) 'The limits of the ECOWAS’s interventionist policy', Al Jazeera.
Duhem, V. (2022) 'Burkina Faso: What we know about the new military strongman, Ibrahim Traoré', The Africa Report.
ECOWAS. (2023) Final Communiqué on the Extraordinary Summit of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government on the Political Situation in Niger.
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Salau, S. (2023) 'Military Coups in West Africa: A Contagion of Bad Governance?', Journal of African-Centered Solutions in Peace and Security, 3(2), pp. 1-21.
